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Europe will be forged in crises, and will be the sum of the solutions adopted 
for those crises.
—Jean Monnet
When things get really difficult... suddenly solutions which seemed 
impossible become possible… Because of this, the crisis represents 
an opportunity. I’m not saying that I enjoy being in a crisis, but 
I’m not worried. Europe always moved forward in times of crisis. 
Sometimes you need a little pressure for certain decisions to be taken.
—Wolfgang Schäuble1
1. Cited in Reuters, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/14/
us-europe-merkel-schaeuble-idUSTRE7BD0IU20111214.
Summary
Doom  and  gloom  about  the  euro  abounds.  An  increasing 
number of commentators and economists, including here at 
the Peterson Institute, have begun to question whether the 
common currency can survive. 
The economic and financial problems in the euro area 
are clearly serious and plentiful. The area is in the midst of 
multiple,  frequently  overlapping,  and  mutually  reinforcing 
crises. A fiscal crisis is centered on Greece but visible across 
the southern euro area and Ireland. A competitiveness crisis 
is manifest in large and persistent pre-crisis current account 
deficits in the euro area periphery and even larger intra-euro-
area current account imbalances. A banking crisis was first 
evident in Ireland but is now spreading throughout the area 
via accelerating concerns over sovereign solvencies.
This policy brief argues that these fears are overblown. 
We  believe  that  the  European  crisis  is  political,  and  even 
largely  presentational,  and  that  this  conclusion  is  key  to 
understanding how the crisis has developed and how it will 
be resolved. 
The lack of confidence in the euro is first and foremost 
rooted  in  a  crisis  of  fundamental  institutional  design.  The 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) adopted in the 1990s 
comprised an extensive (though still incomplete) monetary 
union, with the euro and the European Central Bank (ECB). 
But it included virtually no economic union: no fiscal union, 
no  economic  governance  institutions,  and  no  meaningful 
coordination of structural economic policies. 
It was assumed by the architects that economic union 
would inexorably follow monetary union. However, there was 
no pressure to create an economic union during the expansion 
period prior to the Great Recession. When the crisis hit, the 
contradiction triggered severe market reactions that continue 
to this day. 
There are only two alternatives. Europe can jettison the 
monetary union. Or it can adopt a complementary economic 
union. This brief argues that, for all the turmoil, Europe is well 
on its way to completing the original concept of a compre-N u m b e r   Pb1 2 - 1   j aNu a r y   2 0 1 2
2
hensive economic and monetary union, and that Europe will 
emerge from the crisis much stronger as a result. 
From its creation in the 1990s, the common currency has 
lacked the crucial institutions to ensure that financial stability 
can be restored during times of acute uncertainty and associ-
ated market volatility. The task before euro area leaders today 
therefore ranges far beyond putting together a big enough 
financial  bailout  to  restore  market  confidence.  They  must 
rewrite the euro area rule book and complete the half-built 
euro house. This means they must combine creative financial 
engineering, to resolve the immediate crisis, with a wave of 
new institutions to strengthen the real economy and restore 
sustained growth.
The key to understanding the evolution of the euro is to 
observe and analyze what the Europeans do rather than what 
they say. They have resolved all of the many crises that have 
threatened the European integration project, throughout its 
history of more than half a century, in ways that strengthened 
the institution and moved the project forward. At each key 
stage of the current crisis, they have in fact done whatever is 
necessary to avoid collapse. We have complete confidence that, 
in the crunch, both Germany and the ECB will pay whatever 
is necessary to avert disaster. The politics of each, as described 
below, assure this result.
The problem for the markets is that these central players 
cannot say that this is what they will do. There are two reasons. 
First, a commitment to bailouts without limit would represent 
the ultimate in moral hazard. It would relieve the debtor coun-
tries of the pressure necessary to compel them to take tough 
political decisions and maintain effective adjustment policies. 
Second, each of the four main classes of creditors—Germany 
and  the  other  northern  European  governments,  the  ECB, 
private sector lenders, and the International Monetary Fund (as 
a conduit for non-EU governments like China)—will naturally 
try to transfer as many of the financial losses on Greek govern-
ment bonds or European banks as possible onto the other three, 
limiting their own costs and risks in the process. 
Every  policymaker  in  Europe  knows  that  the  collapse 
of the euro would be a political and economic disaster for 
all and thus totally unacceptable. Fortunately, Europe is an 
affluent region with ample resources to solve its crisis—it is a 
matter of mobilizing the political will to pay rather than the 
economic ability to pay. Europe’s key political actors in Berlin, 
Frankfurt, Paris, Rome, Athens, and elsewhere will thus quite 
rationally exhaust all alternative options in searching for the 
best possible deal before at the last minute coming to an agree-
ment. It is a messy and indeed cacophonous process that is 
understandably unsettling to markets and inherently produces 
enormous  instability.  Miscalculation,  and  thus  disaster,  is 
always possible under such a scenario. But the process relies 
on  financial  market  volatility  to  incentivize  solutions  that 
will ultimately resolve the crisis. Europe’s overriding political 
imperative  to  preserve  the  integration  project  will  surely 
drive its leaders to ultimately secure the euro and restore the 
economic health of the continent.
The PoliTical originS of The euro
The geographic extent of a currency’s use is generally dictated 
by the existing borders of the issuing country. Hence it is 
often the result of prior wars, decolonization or other violent 
historical incidents. The scope for the use of the euro as a 
supranational currency union crafted in peacetime, however, 
has not been dictated by such past events. Rather, it reflects 
contemporary political decisions made by elected European 
leaders.
The entire European project was of course driven by the 
existential  geopolitical  goal  of  halting  the  intra-European 
carnage that had persisted for at least a millennium and reached 
its murderous zenith in the first half of the 20th century. The 
postwar European leadership, driven primarily by Germany 
and France, chose the policy instrument of economic inte-
gration  “to  make  future  wars  impossible.”  The  project  has 
experienced repeated severe crises over its initial half century 
but each was overcome, indeed giving way to renewed forward 
momentum for Europe as a whole. The overriding security 
imperative drove successive generations of political leaders to 
subordinate their national sovereign interests to the greater 
good of maintaining, and in fact extending, the European 
project.
The concept of a common currency was always an element 
in the region’s vision of the ultimate goals of that project. 
Concrete thinking about an economic and monetary union in 
Europe goes back to 1970, when the Werner Report2 laid out 
a detailed three-stage plan for the establishment of EMU by 
1980. Members of the European Community would gradually 
2. Available at http://aei.pitt.edu/1002/1/monetary_werner_final.pdf. 
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increase coordination of economic and fiscal policies while 
reducing  exchange-rate  fluctuations  and  finally  fixing  their 
currencies  irrevocably.  The  collapse  of  the  Bretton  Woods 
system and the first oil crisis in the early 1970s, however, 
caused the Werner Report proposals to be set aside for a time. 
By the mid-1980s, following the creation of the European 
Monetary System in 1979 and the initiation of Europe’s internal 
market, European policymakers again took up the idea of an 
economic and monetary union. The Delors Report3 from 1989 
envisioned the achievement of EMU by 1999, moving gradu-
ally (in three stages) towards closer economic coordination 
among the EU members with binding constraints on member 
states’ national budgets and a single currency managed by an 
independent European Central Bank (ECB).
Optimal  Currency  Area  (OCA)  theory4  prescribes 
the characteristics required for a geographic area to obtain 
maximum economic benefits from adopting the same currency. 
It can offer guidance to economically rational leaders about 
whether it makes sense for their country to join a common 
currency. But it was not a carefully considered and detailed 
economic analysis that ultimately led to the creation of the 
euro. It was geopolitics and the completely unforeseen shock 
of German reunification in October 1990 that provided the 
political impetus for the creation of the Maastricht Treaty,5 
which in 1992 laid the legal foundation and detailed design 
for today’s euro area. 
With  the  historical  parity  in  Europe  between  (West) 
Germany  and  France  no  longer  a  political  and  economic 
reality,  French  president  Francois  Mitterrand  and  German 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl intensified the EMU process as a 
political project to complete the integration of the French, 
German, and other European economies in an economic and 
monetary union that would accomplish full and irrevocable 
European unity.
This political imperative for launching the euro by 1999 
frequently  required  that  politically  necessary  compromises, 
rather  than  theoretically  unambiguous  rules,  make  up  the 
institutional framework for the euro. OCA theory, and the 
earlier Werner  and Delors reports  discussing  the design of 
EMU, had been explicit about the requirement to comple-
ment a European monetary union with a European economic 
union complete with binding constraints on member states’ 
behavior. Political realities in Europe, however, made this goal 
unattainable within the timeframe dictated by political leaders 
following German reunification. 
3. Available at http://aei.pitt.edu/1007/1/monetary_delors.pdf.
4. See Mundell, R. A. 1961. A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas. American 
Economic Review 51 no. 4: 657–665.
5. Available at http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichtec.pdf.
Europeans continue to self-identify primarily as residents 
of their home country.6 Hence the realization of European 
federalism, as it is practiced in the United States, is impos-
sible. Consequently, European institutions do not rest on the 
same degree of direct democratic legitimacy as the US federal 
government.  Crucially,  this  makes  the  collection  of  direct 
taxes to fund a large centralized European budget (similar to 
the US federal budget) politically impossible. The relatively 
high willingness of Europeans to pay taxes does not “extend 
to Brussels.” The designers of the euro area were consequently 
compelled  to  create  the  common  currency  area  without  a 
sizable central fiscal authority that would have the ability to 
counter  region-specific  (asymmetric)  economic  shocks,  or 
re-instill confidence through the deployment of large fiscal 
resources to private market participants in the midst of a crisis.
Similarly, the divergence in the economic starting points 
among  the  politically  prerequisite  “founding  members” 
of the euro area made the imposition of firm fiscal criteria 
for membership in the euro area politically infeasible. The 
Maastricht  Treaty  in  principle  included  at  least  two  hard 
convergence criteria for euro area membership—the 3 percent 
limit on general government annual deficits and the 60 percent 
limit on general government gross debt limit.7 However, in 
reality, these threshold values were anything but fixed as the 
Maastricht Treaty  Article  104c  stated  that  countries  could 
exceed the 3 percent deficit target if “the ratio has declined 
substantially and continuously and reached a level that comes 
close to the reference value” or “excess over the reference value 
is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close 
to the reference value.” Euro area countries could similarly 
exceed the 60 percent gross debt target provided that “the ratio 
is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value 
at a satisfactory pace.” 
In other words, it was a wholly political decision whether 
a country could become a member of the euro area or not. 
Membership was not objectively determined by the funda-
mental economic strengths and reform record of the country 
6. See Kirkegaard, Jacob Funk. 2010. Will It Be Brussels, Berlin, or Financial 
Markets that Check Moral Hazard in Europe’s Bailout Union? Most Likely 
the Latter! PIIE Policy Brief 10-25. Washington: Peterson Institute for 
International Economics. Available at http://www.piie.com/publications/pb/
pb10-25.pdf.
7. The actual numerical reference values to article 104c of the Maastricht 
Treaty are in a protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure to the treaty. 
Available at http://eurotreaties.com/maatrichtprotocols.pdf. The Maastricht 
Convergence Criteria for euro area membership eligibility included three 
other metrics: inflation (within 1.5 percent of the three EU countries with the 
lowest inflation rate), long-term interest rates (within 2 percent of the three 
lowest interest rates in the European Union), and exchange-rate fluctuations 
(participation for two years in the ERM II narrow band of exchange-rate 
fluctuations).N u m b e r   Pb1 2 - 1   j aNu a r y   2 0 1 2
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in question. And it was politically inconceivable to launch the 
euro without Italy, the third largest economy in continental 
Europe, or Belgium, home of the European capital Brussels. 
Hence both countries became members despite having gross 
debt levels of almost twice the Maastricht Treaty reference 
value of 60 percent in 1997–98 (figure 1).
As  a  result,  Europe’s  monetary  union  was  launched  in 
1999 with a set of countries that were far more diverse in their 
economic fundamentals, and far less economically integrated, 
than had been envisioned in the earlier Werner and Delors 
reports or would be dictated by OCA theories. Moreover, shortly 
after the launch of the euro, European political leaders further 
undermined the credibility of the rules-based framework for the 
coordination of national fiscal policies in the euro area. 
Building  on  the  euro  area  convergence  criteria,  the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was intended to safeguard 
sound public finances, prevent individual euro area members 
from  running  unsustainable  fiscal  policies,  and  thus  guard 
against moral hazard by enforcing budget discipline. However, 
faced with breaching the 3 percent deficit limit in 2002–04, 
France and Germany pushed through a watering down of the 
SGP rules in March 20058 that, as in the Maastricht Treaty, 
introduced sufficient flexibility into the interpretation of SGP 
that its enforcement became wholly political and with only 
limited reference to objective economic criteria and data.
In  sum,  the  euro  area  by  2005  was,  as  a  result  of 
numerous shortcuts taken to achieve and sustain a political 
goal, a common currency area consisting of a very dissimilar 
set of countries without a central fiscal authority, without any 
credible enforcement of budget discipline, and without any 
real deepening of economic convergence. 
Initially, however, none of these fundamental design flaws 
mattered. The financing costs in private financial markets of 










Figure 1     General government gross debt 1998, 11 original euro area members
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all euro area members quickly fell towards the traditionally 
low interest rates of Germany (figure 2). 
It is beyond the scope of this policy brief to interpret the 
causes of this colossal and sustained mispricing of credit risk 
in the euro area sovereign debt markets by private investors 
in the first years after the introduction of the euro. But the 
financial  effects  were  obvious:  Euro  area  governments  and 
private investors were able to finance themselves at historically 
low (often significantly negative real) interest rates seemingly 
irrespective of their economic fundamentals. 
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, when he was finance minister 
of France, criticized the “exorbitant privilege” enjoyed by the 
United  States  as  the  issuer  of  the  world’s  reserve  currency, 
enabling it to pay for imports in its own currency and making 
it seemingly oblivious to balance of payment constraints. With 
sudden access to “German interest rates,” many new euro area 
members suddenly enjoyed their own supercharged “exorbitant 
privilege.” Large public and private debt overhangs were corre-
spondingly built up in the euro area in the first years of the new 
currency and in the run-up to the global financial crisis in 2008. 
European policymakers’ initial denial and self-congratula-
tions, coupled with financial markets’ failure to properly assess 
the riskiness of different euro area countries and tendency to 
ignore the common currency’s design flaws, thus conspired to 
ensure that the euro area, when it was finally struck by its 
first serious financial crisis in 2008–09, was hit by a double 
whammy of huge pre-crisis public and private debt overhangs 
and a faulty institutional design that prevented an expeditious 
solution that would be credible to those same markets.
The PoliTical fighT BeTween The ecB and 
governmenTS To Save The euro
During its first decade, the euro area institutional framework 
was that of a “fair weather currency.” The area entered the 
Great Recession woefully under-institutionalized as a common 
currency flying on just one engine—the ECB—but without 
the unified fiscal entity that traditionally plays a critical role in 
combating large financial crises. The euro area leaders have had 
to build their crisis-fighting capacity and bailout institutions 
Figure 2     10-year bond rates among euro area members, January 1992–December 2005
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(the European Financial Stability Facility/European Stability 
Mechanism (EFSF/ESM)) from scratch, and in the midst of 
crisis, to prevent their immediate financial predicament from 
getting  out  of  control  while  simultaneously  reforming  the 
flawed  foundational  institutions  of  the  area.  Achieving  the 
dual policy goals of solving a current crisis while trying also to 
prevent the next one—and using the same policy tools to do 
both—is rarely easy.
This marks a crucial difference from the United States. 
Once the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was finally 
passed,  close  collaboration  between  the  multiple  existing 
institutions in the United States (Treasury, Federal Reserve, 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) ultimately restored 
market  confidence  and  stabilized  the  situation  in  March 
2009. In the United States in 2008–09, the economic crisis 
compelled the Fed to immediately apply the so-called Powell 
Doctrine—overwhelming  firepower—to  restore  shaken 
market confidence and give the federal government time to 
formulate a longer-term response in fits and starts through the 
TARP. This is a fairly well established crisis response function. 
The central bank comes out with monetary guns blazing and 
then sits back and prays that the politicians do the right thing. 
(Congress did pass TARP after initially rejecting it but has of 
course not yet chosen to institute a sustainable fiscal response 
for the United States.)
The ECB, as the only euro area institution capable of 
affecting financial markets in real time, is a uniquely powerful 
central  bank.  Its  institutional  independence  is  enshrined 
in the EU treaty and it is not answerable to any individual 
government. This has enabled it to function as a fully indepen-
dent political actor, interacting with elected officials during 
the crisis in a manner inconceivable among its peers. Quite 
unlike  normal  central  banks,  which  always  have  to  worry 
about losing their institutional independence, in this crisis 
the ECB has been able to issue direct political demands to 
euro area leaders—as with the reform ultimatum conveyed 
to Silvio Berlusconi in August—and demand that they take 
action accordingly.
On  the  other  hand,  the  ECB  has  not  had  the  luxury 
of adopting the straightforward crisis tactics of the Federal 
Reserve and the US government within a fixed set of national 
institutions.  The  ECB  cannot  perform  a  “bridge  function” 
until the proper authorities take over because no euro area 
fiscal entity exists. Moreover, to commit to a major “bridging 
monetary stimulus,” as some have called for, would under-
mine chances of a permanent political resolution to the euro 
area’s  underlying  under-institutionalization  problem.  Were 
the ECB to cap governments’ financing costs at no more than 
5 percent, for instance, euro area politicians would probably 
never make the painful but essential decisions. 
Saddled  with  administering  a  common  currency,  and 
endowed with governing institutions flawed by early political 
compromises,  it  is  hardly  surprising  that  the  ECB’s  domi-
nant concern as it manages this crisis has been to prevent 
“political moral hazard” and not let euro area leaders off the 
hook. Precisely because Silvio Berlusconi would still be prime 
minister of Italy if the ECB had purchased unlimited amounts 
of Italian government bonds at an earlier time, the central 
bank  is  highly  unlikely  to  provide  the  necessary  assistance 
to euro area elected leaders to end the crisis—including the 
Italian successors of Silvio Berlusconi—unless and until they 
offer and implement a suitable quid pro quo. 
It is imperative to understand that it is not the primary 
purpose of the ECB, as a political actor, to end market anxi-
eties and thus the euro area crisis as soon as possible. It is 
instead  focused  on  achieving  its  priority  goals  of  getting 
government leaders to fundamentally reform the euro area 
institutions and structurally overhaul many euro area econo-
mies. Frankfurt cannot directly compel democratically elected 
European leaders to comply with its wishes but it can refuse to 
implement a “crisis bazooka” and thereby permit the euro area 
crisis to continue to put pressure on them to act. A famous 
American politician has said that “no crisis should be wasted” 
and the ECB is implementing such a strategy resolutely.
So  far  the  ECB  has  been  reasonably  effective  in  this 
strategic bargaining with euro area governments. It has also 
consistently been willing to reverse itself when circumstances 
demanded. The initial Greek crisis in May 2010 led to the first 
“grand bargain” between the ECB (which agreed to set up the 
bond purchasing Securities Market Program) and euro area 
governments. Their agreement produced strong commitments 
for structural reforms in Spain and elsewhere. It also produced 
€440 billion in resources for the newly created EFSF, which 
proved  to  be  an  effective  euro  area  fiscal  agent  when  the 
problem was Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. Again, one must 
watch what they do rather than solely what they say.
The EFSF is inadequate when the problem becomes Italy 
and  Spain,  however.  The  ECB  and  euro  area  governments 
have therefore for some time been engaged in a new round of 
strategic bargaining to put together a sufficiently large finan-
cial rescue package, secure structural reform of the two big 
During its first decade, the euro 
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debtors (especially Italy) and, perhaps most importantly, to 
complete the euro area institutional house. The EU Summit 
on December 9, 2011 represented the latest round in this 
game of political poker.
how The decemBer 2011 SummiT Tried To 
ShifT The BailouT Bill onTo Someone 
elSe
The real economy in the euro area has gradually deteriorated 
as regional policymakers dithered in their management of the 
complex crisis. This rising “economic collateral damage” has 
increased the pressure to act and led many to speculate that 
the euro is facing collapse. 
This is nonsense. It is abundantly evident that all the key 
political decision makers in Europe—the ECB, the German 
government, the French government, Italy, and even Greece—
are keenly aware of the catastrophic costs of such an outcome. 
Greek politicians know that, without the euro and outside the 
European Union, their country would collapse into a politi-
cally vulnerable economic wasteland and/or experience a mili-
tary coup (the collapse would be far worse than the economic 
crisis seen since 2009). Angela Merkel knows that, were the 
euro to collapse, Germany’s banks would collapse too under 
the weight of their losses on loans to the euro-area periphery; 
the new Deutsche mark would skyrocket, undermining the 
entire German export economy; and Germany would once 
again be blamed for destroying Europe. The ECB of course 
would not want to put itself out of business. 
Those  political  games  of  chicken  are  repeatedly  being 
played by all actors to try to extract the best possible deal for 
themselves. In the end, all will compromise. It is not a coinci-
dence that Greek political leaders, once threatened with expul-
sion from the euro by Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy at 
the G-20 meeting in Cannes, formed the previously elusive 
national unity government in one week. Italy moved in the 
same manner within days of its diktat from the ECB. Once 
Germany and the ECB feel they have gotten the best possible 
deal, or have run out of alternatives, they will pay whatever 
it takes to hold the euro together. Neither can afford not to. 
But neither can say so in advance or, at the other extreme, risk 
seeing their bluff called.
Seen through these lenses, the EU Summit on December 
9,  2011  developed  in  an  understandable  and  promising 
manner. Two issues were central. 
First, after 18 months of accelerating economic crisis, EU 
leaders finally began detailed political discussions about how 
to reform the flawed euro area institutions. At German (and 
implicitly ECB) insistence, the talks focused on a new “fiscal 
compact” aimed at finally producing for the euro area a set of 
binding budget rules that will constrain member states’ policy 
in the future. Due to the refusal of the United Kingdom to 
accept a revision of the existing EU treaty, a new intergovern-
mental “coalition of the willing” compact will have to be nego-
tiated among a sub-group of the 27 members of the European 
Union.  Substantial  legal  and  institutional  uncertainty  and 
“implementation risk” consequently surround these prelimi-
nary political decisions and the crucial legal details remain 
unfinalized. Yet the fact that 26 (or even 23) European heads 
of state and government declared their political intention to 
enter into a new fiscal compact, which will severely constrain 
their future fiscal sovereignty, is testament to the unflinching 
will to do whatever it takes to save the euro.
Many were disappointed by this narrow agenda and the 
lack of discussion of a larger centralized EU budget, like in 
the United States, or the immediate creation of joint euro-
bonds. However, it must be recalled that, as discussed earlier, 
Europe does not have the democratic legitimacy to collect 
taxes for a centralized budget at this point. Similarly, Europe 
lacks the compelling “endured in a common cause” (i.e., the 
Revolutionary War) political narrative that enabled Alexander 
Hamilton to pool together the debts of individual US states 
into common Treasury bills and bonds. Italy’s debts have been 
run up to benefit Italians and other European taxpayers will 
surely revolt if suddenly compelled to pay part of them. 
The reality in the euro area is that, for the foreseeable 
future  and  unlike  in  the  United  States,  the  overwhelming 
majority of government taxation and spending will continue 
to reside at the member state level for reasons of political legit-
imacy. Only a minor part will be pooled at the supra-national 
level. Restricting this spending via a new fiscal compact is 
consequently the only pragmatic route for now, leaving other 
aspects of euro area fiscal integration to the future. 
Second, EU leaders tried to thrash out a sufficiently large 
financial firewall to restore confidence in the solvency of Italy 
and Spain. This issue was addressed in several ways. For one, 
euro area leaders reversed their initial intent to insert Private 
Sector  Involvement  (PSI)  clauses  into  the  new  permanent 
ESM treaty. This should make it clear that private sovereign 
bond market investors face the same legal environment in the 
euro area as elsewhere, making the case for “Greece being a 
unique case” legally and politically more credible. This should 
ultimately help restore fleeting investor confidence in euro 
area sovereign bonds. In the grand game of distributing the 
costs of the euro area bailouts, private investors will not be 
asked to take haircuts other than in Greece in the hope they 
will then lend new money to the other debtor countries as the 
latter undertake the needed adjustments.N u m b e r   Pb1 2 - 1   j aNu a r y   2 0 1 2
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EU leaders further continued their sparring about the 
ultimate distribution of the costs of extending the euro area 
financial rescue by pledging €200 billion (€150 billion from 
the euro area) in new general resources to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). This would come in the form of loans 
from EU central banks9 with the political understanding that 
the  resources  would  be  utilized  predominantly  to  stabilize 
Italy and Spain. This attempt to involve the IMF directly in 
the rescue of the two larger euro area economies is in many 
ways reminiscent of the two-thirds/one-third financing split 
between the euro area and the rest of the world (as share-
holders  of  the  IMF10)  for  the  existing  IMF  programs  for 
Greece, Ireland, and Portugal.
However,  given  the  better  economic  fundamentals  in 
Italy and Spain and the prohibitively high costs of extending 
to them the type of traditional IMF programs granted to the 
three smaller euro area economies, a less politically intrusive 
and less expensive vehicle for IMF involvement may be found. 
This will still presumably entail special IMF borrowing from 
surplus and creditor countries around the world. A number 
have already said they will participate in such an initiative: 
Brazil,  new  G-20  chair  Mexico,  Russia,  and  a  number  of 
non-euro Europeans. China and other large Asian holders of 
foreign exchange have been more coy. They have also clearly 
indicated a desire to diversify their huge reserves away from 
dollars, however, so new claims on the IMF would presumably 
look quite attractive to them from a purely financial manage-
ment point of view. 
Total IMF borrowing, and the creation of a “firewall” to 
insure against default by major euro area countries, should 
and probably will exceed €1 trillion. Taken in combination 
with the €500 billion in the EFSF/ESM, the €700 billion or 
more from the ECB from its previous programs (€211 billion 
in sovereign bond purchases through the Securities Markets 
Programme (SMP), €489 billion in three-year loans11), and 
its essentially unlimited liquidity provisions to the euro area 
banking system, this amount should convince even the most 
skeptical market participants that the “firewall” is adequate 
even for Italy and Spain. 
In now turning to the IMF, the euro area leaders acknowl-
edge that their previous “euro area governments only” EFSF 
9. Note that this means that any loans made to the IMF by euro area central 
banks will expand the consolidated European System of Central Banks’ 
(ESCB) balance sheet, even if the loans are not disbursed by the ECB itself.
10. The two-thirds/one-third breakdown is not entirely accurate, as the euro 
area members are sizable shareholders of the IMF themselves and hence in 
total contribute more than two-thirds of the total financing of these programs.
11. One might arguably also add the two ECB-covered bond purchase pro-
grams (~€62 billion) with unlimited liquidity of less than a three-year duration 
to these central bank support measures.
bailout vehicle will not be an efficient mechanism through 
which to provide assistance to Italy and Spain. While this may 
seem like a political setback, going through the IMF rather 
than the (leveraged) EFSF in fact provides the euro area with 
significant credit enhancement because it makes it much more 
likely that other IMF member governments, e.g., China and 
other surplus countries, will choose to contribute. 
In that way the IMF will quite likely serve as a far better 
leverage mechanism for the euro area’s own resources (€150 
billion) than had this money instead simply been added to 
the EFSF itself.12 Euro area governments will have success-
fully shifted part of the costs of any future financial rescues 
onto the rest of the world. The rest of the world will of course 
extract a suitable price from the euro area for this service in the 
form of European political concessions in other policy areas. 
This could, for instance, be a good time to demand that the 
euro area consolidate its representation on the IMF board to a 
single seat and accelerate the transfer of its quota shares to the 
financially contributing emerging markets. 
Recent  ECB  policies  have  similarly  tried  to  shift  the 
bailout cost to other entities. In his December 1, 2011 testi-
mony before the EU Parliament Mario Draghi famously stated 
“We might be asked whether a new fiscal compact would be 
enough to stabilize markets and how a credible longer term 
vision can be helpful in the short term. Our answer is that 
it is definitely the most important element to start restoring 
credibility. Other elements might follow, but the sequencing 
matters.”13 This was immediately taken by markets to mean 
that, provided EU leaders agree on a new “fiscal compact,” the 
ECB would be willing to step up its sovereign bond market 
interventions and largely pick up the tab for bailing out Italy 
and Spain. 
Unsurprisingly, euro area bond markets rallied strongly 
in the expectation of an official sector bailout from the ECB 
until the next Mario Draghi press conference on December 8, 
2011, when he walked back his earlier comments by stating 
in response to a question that: “The purpose of the SMP is to 
reactivate the transmission channels of monetary policy. As I 
said in the statement to the European Parliament, the SMP is 
neither eternal nor infinite. We must keep this in mind and 
we do not want to circumvent Article 123 of the treaty, which 
prohibits the monetary financing of governments… the need 
to respect the spirit of the treaty should always be present in 
12. Routing euro area central bank loans through the IMF general resources 
also provides governments a better “legal fig-leaf” against political charges of 
“monetary financing” (voiced by, for instance, the German Bundesbank) than 
if such loans had been used to leverage the EFSF directly.
13. Available at http://www.ecb.int/ press/key/date/2011/html/sp111201.
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our minds.”14 Hence the ECB would not be willing to proac-
tively bail out private investors in the Italian and Spanish debt 
markets. Those markets fell dramatically on the very day of 
the EU Summit.
The ECB signal thus sent to EU leaders ahead of their 
summit seemed unambiguous: It is up to the fiscal authorities, 
not the monetary authorities, to pay to restore market confi-
dence in the Italian and Spanish bond markets. By turning to 
the IMF at their summit, euro area leaders indicated that they 
had clearly gotten the message.
The ECB refused to intervene directly and more force-
fully in the euro area sovereign bond markets on December 8, 
2011. But the central bank did effectively bail out the entire 
EU banking system, and with it many of the private sovereign 
bond creditors, through a series of additional enhanced credit 
support measures to support bank lending and liquidity in 
the euro area. These included unlimited liquidity provisions 
for three years, compared to a previous maximum of one year, 
expanded ECB collateral eligibility to include bank loans, and 
cutting the reserve ratio in half to 1 percent.15
These  forceful  ECB  liquidity  measures  were  clearly 
warranted given the stress in the inter-bank credit markets in 
the euro area. However, they also provide a potential back door 
for euro area banks to use some of the funding available from 
the ECB to purchase additional euro area sovereign bonds 
and thereby stabilize markets. In this way, assuming that euro 
area banks can be morally swayed to make such purchases, the 
ECB would indirectly provide the financing for private banks 
to support the euro area sovereigns. This would constitute a 
below-the-radar bailout of governments by the ECB through 
the private banking system with the political benefits to the 
central bank that it does not violate the EU treaty ban on 
monetary financing. 
In summary, the December 9, 2011 EU Summit shows 
how the key actors in the euro area crisis are still positioning 
themselves to force others to pick up as much of the costs of 
the euro area crisis as possible. In the meantime, the crisis 
continues and may superficially appear to be insoluble. There 
are in fact several possible solutions to stave off a near term 
meltdown, however, when Italy and Spain begin their large 
bond rollovers in early 2012:
n  Germany  can  write  a  check  and  agree  to  expand  the 
EFSF/ESM and/or give it a banking license.
14. Available at http://www.ecb.int/ press/pressconf/2011/html/is111208.
en.html.
15. Available at http://www.ecb.int/ press/pr/date/2011/html/pr111208_1.
en.html.
n  The IMF can write a check using new resources from the 
euro area and rest of the world to put together a sizable 
new support program for Italy and/or Spain.
n  The ECB can write a check and begin to purchase much 
larger amounts of the relevant sovereign bonds. 
It remains to be seen which solution will ultimately be 
chosen. It is possible, indeed likely, that the ultimate package 
will combine parts of each of the above. But it is obvious that 
none of these solutions are even remotely as costly for any 
of the main actors involved, inside or outside the euro area, 
as a sovereign default in Italy and/or collapse of the euro. 
That is why, once the political pre-positioning is over and the 
alternatives are exhausted, the games of chicken will end and 
the political decision on how to split the bill for securing the 
euro’s survival will be made.
The remaining agenda
Even the most successful financial engineering in the euro 
area  will  ultimately  fail,  however,  if  the  debtor  countries, 
and indeed the region as a whole, are unable to restore at 
least modest economic growth in the fairly near future. This 
requires at least three major steps:
n  The  borrowing  countries  must  adopt  convincing  pro-
growth  structural  reforms,  especially  in  their  labor 
markets, as well as budgetary austerity.
n  The strong economies in the northern core of Europe, 
especially  Germany,  must  terminate  their  own  fiscal 
consolidations for a while and adopt new expansionary 
measures, i.e., they should buy more Italian and Greek 
goods and services rather than debt instruments. 
n  The ECB must promptly reduce its policy interest rate 
by  at  least  another  50  basis  points  and  buy  sufficient 
amounts of periphery bonds through the SMP to help 
push their interest rates down to sustainable levels.
There  has  been  much  talk  about  the  infeasibility  of 
achieving the needed “internal devaluations” of the periphery 
countries.  Germany  has  achieved  just  such  an  adjustment 
over the past two decades, however, probably amounting to 
about 20 percent of the (overvalued) exchange rate at which 
it entered the ERM/euro, through a combination of budget 
tightening and structural changes like the Hartz labor reforms. 
At the other end of the size spectrum, Latvia achieved an even 
speedier and more spectacular correction of its huge current 
account deficit of 25 percent of GDP and, only three years 
later,  is  now  combining  renewed  growth  with  an  external N u m b e r   Pb1 2 - 1   j aNu a r y   2 0 1 2
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surplus. Italy has previously achieved dramatic adjustment, 
notably to qualify for the euro in the first place. (Greece never 
did so and its ability to remain within the zone is clearly more 
problematic.) 
The agenda for the euro area, and indeed Europe more 
broadly, thus ranges well beyond the financial engineering that 
is clearly the most urgent requirement to overcome the crisis. 
Both the history of the integration project and the revealed 
responses at each stage of the current turmoil, however, suggest 
that both the historical imperatives and economic self-interest 
of all the key countries, both creditor and debtor, will coalesce 
successfully. Watch what they do rather than what they say as 
the drama continues to unfold.
The final major political challenge on the euro area agenda 
for 2012 goes beyond measures to address the immediate crisis 
but rather focuses on the longer-term continuation and direc-
tion of euro area institutional reform. During 2012, the euro 
area is likely to adopt a new and considerably more credible 
set of fiscal rules and budget oversight regulation. This has 
been a clear demand from both the ECB and Germany. But 
while the new fiscal compact will undoubtedly help stabilize 
the euro area in the future, it must be thought of as merely a 
beginning of the institutional reforms needed in the region. 
Fiscal  consolidation  is  not  everything  and  the  movement 
toward further and symmetrical deepening of euro area fiscal 
integration must be maintained. Following the “fiscal rules 
first”  down  payment,  euro  area  leaders  must  consequently 
take further concrete steps in 2012 on a reasonable timetable 
toward the introduction of measures such as eurobonds.
It took ten years for the first serious economic and political 
crisis to arrive after the euro was introduced. The most chal-
lenging part of today’s crisis is to use the political opportunity 
it  presents  to  get  the  basic  economic  institutions  right  and 
complete the euro’s half built house for the long term. In this 
process the euro will develop in a different manner from the 
full economic and monetary union established in the United 
States. It will require additional substantial treaty and institu-
tional revisions in the future. But as the US Constitution’s 27 
current amendments clearly show, faulty initial designs need 
not preclude long-term success. If the history of the integration 
exercise and its crisis responses to date are any guide, Europe will 
emerge from its current turmoil not only with the euro intact 
but with far stronger institutions and economic prospects for 
the future.
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